American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump by Hal Brands

Author:Hal Brands [Brands, Hal]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
Published: 0101-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

ASSESSING A BETTER NATIONALISM

So, what are the strengths and liabilities of this approach? For starters, all of the individual initiatives sketched previously entail their own drawbacks and dilemmas. Using targeted sanctions too aggressively could undermine rather than strengthen the global trading system; emphasizing bilateral rather than multilateral trade deals could have the same effect, while also making weaker trade partners less inclined to pursue such deals with the United States in the first place.44 Getting tougher with allies risks upsetting what have been remarkably organic and constructive international relationships of long standing; it also raises the question of what Washington should do when one or more of its allies inevitably fails to improve performance sufficiently.45 Taking even a modestly more aggressive approach to counterterrorism might improve operational effectiveness, but it also increases the probable military risks and costs. Pushing back harder on great-power coercion carries dangers of escalation and increased conflict. All these initiatives come with significant advantages, too, but they are by no means panaceas.

These points touch on a second and broader challenge. Although a better nationalism would be far milder than Fortress America, it would still involve significant international disruption. Getting better deals requires bargaining harder; bargaining harder means exerting real pressure on interlocutors. A better nationalism would thus require deliberately engendering greater friction with actors from China and Saudi Arabia to NATO and the UN; those actors would likely push back and find ways of making their displeasure known.46 The result is likely to be a period of considerable turbulence in U.S. diplomacy, as existing arrangements shift and key relationships—with allies and rivals alike—are renegotiated. There is also, of course, the danger that the initiatives outlined here might prove insufficient to secure more advantageous arrangements and better burden-sharing. U.S. officials would then confront the unpalatable options of either escalating pressure and risking more severe ruptures and crises, or simply backing down and leaving the original problem unresolved.

This point underscores a third difficulty, which is that executing this approach effectively would require real skill and sophistication. As noted, all of the initiatives discussed here have their difficulties. Yet the overarching challenge is how to shock the system enough to achieve meaningful change—as Nixon did in the 1970s by ending Bretton Woods—without breaking it in the process. Pressure and reassurance are both essential, in other words, and careful calibration is at once vital and hard to achieve. Too much pressure can damage valuable relationships, cause confrontation with allies and competitors, and make Washington look like a dangerous bully. But too much reassurance can undercut the pressure that is essential to getting results. In the past, even presidents now recognized for their diplomatic achievements—such as Nixon and Reagan—often found this a tricky balance to strike. Asking a President Trump—who has frequently acted as a geopolitical blunderbuss—to do as well or better might be a tall order.

Pursuing a better nationalism, then, is no silver bullet. But it does carry distinct strategic advantages, especially when compared to Fortress America. First, it reflects

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